



AG Hogan’s Opinion in Avis 1/19 regarding the
Istanbul Convention
Citation for published version (APA):
Chamon, M. (Author). (2021). AG Hogan’s Opinion in Avis 1/19 regarding the Istanbul Convention. Web
publication/site
Document status and date:
Published: 15/03/2021
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
























Suggested citation: Merijn Chamon, “AG Hogan’s Opinion in Avis 1/19 regarding the Istanbul Convention”, EU Law 

















This Op-Ed will comment on Advocate General 
(AG) Hogan’s Opinion in Opinion procedure 1/19 
regarding the Istanbul Convention. Of course, an 
Op-Ed does not allow for a fully-fledged analysis 
and will therefore limit itself to discussing the 
main points and flagging up the more remarkable 
findings in the AG’s Opinion. For the same 
reason, the political dimension to the ratification 
of the Istanbul Convention will not be covered 
either, and this Op-Ed will focus purely on the 
legal issues raised by the Convention. 
Considering the constraints of space, the context 
of and background to Opinion procedure 1/19 will 
not be repeated here. Readers are instead directed 
to the earlier EU Law Live Insight published on 
the occasion of the oral hearing. Dispensing with 
this allows this Op-Ed to go straight to the 
discussion of AG Hogan’s Opinion, which will be 
structured around the three main legal questions at 
issue: the legal basis issue, the question of the 
splitting of decisions, and the question of the 
requirement of common accord. The AG’s 
analysis of the admissibility of the European 
Parliament’s request also raises interesting 
questions but to keep the focus exclusively on the 
questions which the Parliament puts to the Court 
of Justice, they will not be analysed here either. 
Legal basis 
To recall, the European Commission had proposed 
to sign and conclude the Istanbul Convention 
based on Articles 82(2) TFEU (judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters) and 84 TFEU 
(supporting measures in crime prevention). In 
its decision on the signature, the Council of the 
European Union dropped the latter provision and 
instead added Articles 78(2) TFEU (asylum) and 
83(1) TFEU (definition of crimes and sanctions 
for serious crimes such as human trafficking and 
sexual exploitation). 
The analysis of the AG here is rich but quite 
complex, especially for those not fully familiar 
with the law of EU external relations. To properly 
understand the AG’s Opinion, two preliminary 
points need to be made: 
First, as the AG rightly notes (points 66-85), the 




a bit differently when it comes to choosing the 
legal basis of a decision on the signature or 
conclusion of a mixed agreement. Where for an 
internal legislative act (or an EU-only agreement), 
the assessment must be based on the objectives 
and content of the entire act, the test for a mixed 
agreement does not relate to that agreement in its 
entirety but only to those parts to which the EU 
will commit itself. The centre of gravity of the 
Council Decision concluding the Istanbul 
Convention may therefore be different from the 
centre of gravity of the Istanbul Convention itself. 
To which parts of the Convention will the EU 
commit itself? The AG finds that for those parts 
coming under EU exclusive competence, in the 
sense of Article 3 TFEU, the issue is simple: since 
the Member States lack that competence, the 
EU must exercise its competence (point 91). For 
the parts coming under shared competence in the 
sense of Articles 4-6 TFEU, the AG puts forward 
that there is a (presumably unfettered) political 
choice to be made by the Council on whether it 
wishes the EU to exercise those competences. By 
taking that position (and by not identifying any 
legal check on this political choice, despite such 
checks being suggested by other AGs (see point 
120 of AG Wahl in Opinion 3/15, and point 114 of 
AG Kokott’s Opinion in Joined Cases C-626/15 
and C-659/16)) the AG essentially accepts that 
what the Court consistently refers to as ‘a test 
based on objective factors amenable to judicial 
review’ becomes subverted by the judicially 
unreviewable subjective will of the Council: the 
legal basis that will have to be relied on and which 
is proof of EU competence is determined by the 
extent to which the Council wishes the EU to 
exercise its competences. This premiss permeates 
the AG’s analysis of the legal basis-test and is 
consistently repeated throughout (see inter alia 
points 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 96, 112, 131, 
135, 136, 159, 161, 164 and 166). 
A second preliminary point is at the same time a 
point of critique. More than once (inter alia points 
89 and 146) the AG suggests that his analysis is 
informed by the very specific case of the Istanbul 
Convention, namely that what ‘makes this case so 
specific [is] that the Union will not exercise all of 
the competences it shares with the Member 
States’. The AG is right that it might be unusual 
for the EU not to exercise the competences that 
accord to the agreement’s main objectives and 
provisions (and instead restricts itself to the 
competences according to an agreement’s 
subsidiary objectives or provisions). However, 
that the EU does not fully exercise its shared 
competences in its external relations is actually the 
rule which explains why many agreements are 
concluded as mixed rather than EU-only 
agreements. 
In performing the legal basis-test in casu, the AG 
thus starts from the premiss that the EU will not 
fully exercise all its relevant shared competences 
and instead takes as a baseline the minimum 
common denominator on which all EU institutions 
agree that the EU should commit itself. This 
baseline effectively corresponds to the Council’s 
position, which is thus used to determine whether 
the Council rightly (intends to) alter the legal 
bases proposed by the Commission (point 90). The 
AG thereby notes that should the easy route be 
taken, and should the Council allow the EU to 
exercise its competences to the fullest, the relevant 
legal bases would simply be Articles 3(3) TEU 
and 19 TFEU (point 129). 
The AG then proceeds to check three issues: (i) 




take into account those parts of the Istanbul 
Convention that come under EU exclusive 
competence (and which therefore must be covered 
by the decision on conclusion); (ii) do these 
commitments coming under EU exclusive 
competence constitute the predominant aim and 
content of the decision on conclusion (thus 
requiring a separate legal basis); and (iii) are the 
other commitments which the EU intends to enter 
into predominant or merely ancillary? Evidently, 
in the latter case they would not require a separate 
legal basis. 
As for the possible exclusive competences in play 
(i), the AG identifies a partially exclusive EU 
competence (as a result of the AETR doctrine) for 
judicial cooperation in civil matters and conditions 
of employment of EU officials and servants 
(points 143 and 145). However (ii), of those two, 
the former is ancillary (point 153) and therefore, 
only the latter requires a separate legal basis in the 
form of Article 336 TFEU (point 164). Here again 
the AG recalls that the Istanbul Convention’s 
predominant aim and content does not at all relate 
to how the EU treats its civil servants but that this 
is also not the relevant question to be answered: 
since the Council will make a choice to leave most 
of the competence for the Istanbul Convention to 
the Member States, the relevant question is what 
the predominant components are of what is left for 
the EU to agree to. And among the limited 
remaining aspects left to the EU, that of how it 
treats its own civil servants does constitute a main 
component. On the other commitments (coming 
under shared competence) (iii), the AG retains 
Article 82(2) TFEU as a legal basis, noting that the 
three political institutions were also all in 
agreement that at least this provision was one of 
the legal bases (point 152). The AG does not retain 
Article 83(1) TFEU as a legal basis since the 
substantive criminal law provisions in the Istanbul 
Convention only in some cases come under the 
heading of trafficking in human beings or of the 
sexual exploitation of women and children 
mentioned in Article 83(1) TFEU (point 155). The 
AG also retains Article 84 TFEU as a legal basis 
by reading that provision broadly and because the 
Istanbul Convention stresses the importance of the 
prevention of violence (points 156-159). The AG 
finally also retains Article 78(2) TFEU as a legal 
basis. Hold on, the reader familiar with the 
Council’s decisions on the signature of the 
Istanbul Convention will now say. Didn’t the 
Council in its decision on signature identify the 
Convention’s provisions on asylum as coming 
under EU exclusive competence? Indeed, the AG 
disagrees on this point with the Council and finds 
(applying Opinion 2/91) that there is 
no AETR effect, since both the common rules and 
the Convention’s provisions lay down minimum 
requirements (point 104). Since it has also 
been argued that despite these minimum rules, the 
Convention may still very well interfere with EU 
asylum law (thus resulting in an AETR effect), it 
will be interesting to see if and how the Court 
engages with the AG’s proposed solution. Coming 
back to the AG’s assessment of the EU’s shared 
competence on the Convention’s provisions 
related to asylum, he finds these to be 
substantively significant (again, especially given 
the limited commitments which will be left to the 
EU to commit to) since it requires parties to 
recognise violence against women as one of the 
forms of persecution that may give rise to refugee 
status (points 160-162). 
All this means, according to the AG, that the 





 Splitting of decisions 
A second issue on which the European Parliament 
queries the Court is the Council’s intention to split 
the decision on conclusion to allow Ireland, 
pursuant to Protocol No 21, not to be committed 
through the EU to the Convention’s provisions on 
asylum (notably Articles 60 and 61 of the 
Convention), just like it split the decision on 
signature. The argument of the Parliament here 
appears to be that since these relevant provisions 
of the Convention are already largely covered by 
EU common rules which Ireland follows 
internally, Ireland could no longer opt-out in the 
conclusion of the Convention (point 185). The AG 
refutes the Parliament’s reasoning on two 
accounts. 
The AG first puts forward that it is difficult to see 
which requirement of EU law prohibits the 
splitting of decisions (point 172), let alone that 
such a requirement, if it were to be found, would 
constitute an essential procedural requirement 
(point 175). Under the Court’s well-established 
case law on Article 263 TFEU however, only the 
violation of essential procedural requirements 
will give rise to the annulment of the contested act. 
The AG thereby dismisses the idea that the 
Council splitting a decision could undermine the 
prerogatives of the Parliament or Commission. 
Yet, assuming there is no need to split (and this is 
a crucial assumption, see below), it is difficult to 
argue that those prerogatives are not affected: if 
there is no objective need to split, splitting unduly 
frustrates the exercise of Parliament’s scrutiny 
prerogatives under Article 218 TFEU and 
frustrates the Commission’s task to act on behalf 
of and watch over the general EU interest, 
reflected in Articles 17(2) TEU and 293 TFEU. 
This would be so even if the Commission has 
agreed to the splitting (as it did, see point 12) since 
an EU institution cannot, even voluntarily, 
dispense with its own prerogatives. Drawing on 
the MFA case, the AG suggests that Article 293 
TFEU only applies to the legislative process (point 
174) but that would be an awkward reading 
of MFA and Article 293 TFEU. The latter lays 
down a general rule and in MFA the Court merely 
noted that it applies especially in the legislative 
process, not only in the legislative process. 
Of course, even if there is no requirement 
prohibiting splitting, the decision to split (pursuant 
to Protocol No 21) would still be unlawful if this 
violates Protocol No 21 itself. This is the second 
point on which the AG disagrees with the 
Parliament. The AG believes that splitting the 
decision would instead be required by Protocol 
No 21 which in its Article 4a provides that the 
Protocol also applies to measures proposed or 
adopted that amend existing measures which 
Ireland has agreed to participate in. AG Hogan 
thus reads Article 4a as also preventing 
an AETR effect from arising, otherwise, according 
to the AG, ‘Article 4a of Protocol No 21 would be 
devoid of any real meaning’ (point 188). 
However, this finding is rather puzzling and seems 
to disregard the nature of the AETR effect which is 
produced by the common rule (to which Ireland 
agreed to participate) and which cannot be equated 
with an amendment or modification since it is 
triggered solely by the risk that common rules 
may be affected (namely it is not triggered by 
the de facto modification or amendment of 
common rules). Unfortunately, the AG does not 
further explore the question whether Ireland could 
then at all be a party to the Istanbul Convention, 
since the AG accepts that even if not bound 
through the EU, Ireland may still not undermine 




Protocol No 21 (point 190). It will be interesting 
to see if and how the Court addresses this point, 
since that would further clarify 
how AETR interacts with Protocol No 21 and 
perhaps the nature of the doctrine. Indeed, under 
the AG’s reasoning, the AETR’s pre-emptive 
effect (Ireland cannot act externally in a way that 
would undermine the common rules to which it 
agreed) is effectively dissociated from the 
‘creation’ of an exclusive competence for the EU 
(the EU not having competence, according to the 
AG, to commit Ireland without its agreement), 
whereas as normally both go hand in hand. 
Common accord 
Finally, the European Parliament’s second 
question will for the first time allow the Court to 
address the legality of the contested practice of 
finding a common accord between Member States 
(by unanimity) on the conclusion of a mixed 
agreement, before the Council will allow the EU 
to conclude the agreement (even if the Council 
could do so with a qualified majority). 
According to the Parliament, putting EU-decision-
making on hold until all Member States agree goes 
beyond ‘sincere cooperation’ and instead de 
facto changes the voting rules within the Council, 
thereby resulting in hybrid decision making (point 
196) which the Court prohibited in the Hybrid 
acts case. 
On this the AG recalls that following the signature 
of an agreement (such as the Istanbul Convention), 
the only international law obligation on the EU 
results from Article 18 of the Vienna Convention 
(VCLT), meaning there is no obligation under 
international law on the Council to initiate the 
conclusion of the Istanbul Convention. On 
whether such an obligation exists under EU law, 
the AG is less clear. Above it was recalled that the 
AG suggested that the Council is entirely free to 
decide which shared competences of the EU it will 
elect to exercise (since only the exclusive 
competences must be exercised). When it comes 
to taking the decision to conclude however, the 
AG notes that the Council has a large margin of 
discretion (point 200) which suggests that it is still 
judicially reviewable and that hence there must be 
some relevant legal standard to test against. 
However, the AG does not identify that legal 
standard, since he finds that the Parliament’s 
argument is in any event incorrect: by waiting for 
all Member States to agree, the Council is not 
altering or ‘hybridising’ the voting procedure. 
Here the AG even adduces reasons justifying the 
Council’s approach, since if the EU would 
conclude in absence of a common accord and the 
mixed agreement would enter into force, the EU 
could be held jointly liable for Member States’ 
(in)action, even if those Member States act 
pursuant to retained national powers and are not 
themselves party to the agreement in question 
(point 205). While in general such problems may 
be pre-empted by the EU expressing a reservation, 
the Istanbul Convention does not permit 
reservations that could be used for this purpose 
(point 207). The Istanbul Convention, unlike a lot 
of other mixed multilateral agreements, does not 
contain a RIO-clause either. Because of this, the 
AG finds that the EU cannot adopt a declaration of 
competences, setting out the limited extent to 
which it commits itself and its Member States, 
since this would amount to a prohibited 
reservation (points 208-210). Of course, had there 
been a RIO-clause in the Istanbul Convention, the 
situation would have been entirely different, 
which underscores the need for the Commission to 




negotiation of these agreements, which in this case 
it was not. 
At the same time as finding that the Council does 
not manifestly err when waiting for the common 
accord of the Member States, the AG finds that 
neither is the Council required to wait for such a 
common accord (point 222). Incomplete mixed 
agreements, because of the EU acceding without 
all its Member States or because of Member States 
denouncing the agreement following its entry into 
force, result in practical problems but these 
problems do not legally prevent the EU from 
becoming (or remaining) a party to a mixed 
agreement (points 221-225). 
The AG’s findings on the issue of common accord 
will undoubtedly disappoint the European 
Parliament (and the Commission) but in light of 
the Court’s post-Lisbon external relations case law 
it would not be surprising for the Court to follow 
the AG on this point. While the Court has 
been enthusiastic in finding EU exclusive 
competence wherever possible, its decisions in 
COTIF I (paragraph 68) and AMP Antarticque 
(paragraph 126) also make clear that it does not 
wish to intervene in the political process when the 
Council has to decide on the exercise of EU shared 
competences. 
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